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INDIANA LEGIsLATION-1947
tion. The Act specifically permits the clerk to continue-0
to allow wills to probate and to grant letters of administra-
tion and letters testamentary during vacation.
Appeals from Corner Surveys-In 1852 a provision was en-
acted 5" whereby landowners could have the county surveyor
establish a corner between their adjoining lands. Such sur-
vey is prima facie correct, although provision was made for
an appeal within three years. The appeal period has been
changed and residents of the county, having personal notice
of the proceeding, must now perfect an appeal within ninety
days. Persons receiving notice by the publication must ap-
peal within one year.52.
Lis Pendens Record--In any action concerning land, com-
menced in any court in Indiana, including federal district
courts sitting in this state, notice must be given the clerk
of the circuit court where the land is situated.53  Previously
no provision was made for causes instituted in the federal
courts in such instances.5 4
Whenever a suit on a bond payable to the State of In-
diana is commenced in any court of this state, including fed-
eral district courts sitting in Indiana, notice of such suit
must be given to "the clerk of the circuit court."55  Quaere:
Which "clerk of the circuit court" would be the proper re.
cipient of notice of a suit commenced in the federal district
court?
PROPERTY
Mechanics' Liens-Chapter 23 of the Acts of 1947 provides
a procedure by which a property owner may secure the for-
mal release of a mechanics' lien which has been recorded
(upon his property) for more than two years. The owner
files a personal affidavit with the recorder of the county in
which the property is situated, stating that no suit has been
filed and no unsatisfied judgment rendered against the prop-
50. Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), c. 45, §2, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933) §6-102.
51. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 103, §8, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§49-3313.
52. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 263, §1.
53. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 98, §1.
54. Ind. Acts 1889, c. 96, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1946) §2-814.
55. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 98, §1.
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erty.1 It is then the duty of the recorder to certify across
the face of the record of the lien that it is fully satisfied and
that the real estate is released from the lien. 2
Water Rights-Chapter 154 regulates the quantity and man-
ner in which ground waters may be removed for air condi-
tioning and cooling purposes. After January, 1948, no more
than 200 gallons per minute can be removed unless it is cir-
culated through cooling towers or otherwise returned through
recharge wells, unless a permit is secured from the Indiana
Department of Conservation. The department shall issue a
permit if it finds the withdrawal will not affect the ground
water resources of the area, to an extent that will cause
injury to the public health and welfare of the community.
Before percolating water taken for cooling purposes is re-
turned to the ground a permit must be secured from the
State Board of Health. No provision is made for the punish-
ment of violations of the act.
Chapter 181 declares that the State is vested with the
full power and control of all fresh water lakes of the State
and holds them in trust for the use of all citizens. No person
owning adjoining land has the exclusive right to the use of
waters of such lakes. It is made unlawful for anyone to
extend the shore line of a public fresh water lake by draining
or filling in the waters. The act provides that no rights shall
accrue to riparian owners through draining a lake or build-
ing into it; acretion rights are limited to lands from which
waters have naturally receded.3  In these respects the act
codifies the common law.4 The act does not apply to marsh
lands that were covered by a lake which has receded, nor to
lands under the waters of Lake Michigan. The only sanction
in the act is that the Indiana Department of Conservation
may enjoin a person violating the provisions of the act.
1. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §10-3802 provides that anyone who
wilfully makes false statements in an affidavit is guilty of perjury
and punishable accordingly.
2. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1946) §3-1633. procedure for can-
celling gas and oil leases by affidavit of owner of land.
3. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1946) §§2-618, 2-619.
3. However, the Indiana Department of Conservation may, after an
investigation, grant a permit to the owner of land abutting upon
a lake to extend the shore line of the lake by filling in.
4. See Tiffany, "Real Property" (1940) §§461, 507 et. seq. 765.
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Descent and Inheritance-Chapter 2565 provides that a second
or subsequent childless husband now takes the same interest
as a second or subsequent childless widow-i.e., a life estate
in one third of the wife's real property. The new act also
changes the wording of the repealed act from "without chil-
dren by him" to "without children by him or her living at
time of his or her death." This was the interpretation which
early had been placed upon these ambiguous words by the
Indiana courts.8
Conveyances By Infants-Chapter 220 enables any married
man or woman under the age of twenty-one years, to make
contracts, mortgages, conveyances, or agreements to convey
interests in real estate if the spouse is an adult and joins in
the transaction. It is a condition precedent that the minor
first secure the consent of the judge of the circuit court in
which he resides. Formerly, this was permissible only in the
case of a minor married woman.7
Statute of Limitations-The State Bar Association ap-
pointed a committee in 1944 to recommend changes in the
Indiana statute of limitations and to draft a complete model
abstract in order to remedy the present complicated and ex-
pensive abstracting system and to provide a uniform system
of abstracting throughout the state." Chapter 193 is the
result of this effort of the Bar Association., The declared
legislative purpose of the act is to simplify and facilitate land
5. Specifically repeals Ind. Acts 1899, c. 99, §2, p. 131; Ind. Acts
1901, c. 240, §1, p. 554, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-2315, and
substantially reenacts it. For similar provisions for a widow see
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-2321.
6. Thompson v. Henry, 153 Ind. 56, 54 N.E. 109 (1899); Utterback
v. Terhune, 75 Ind. 363 (1881).
7. Ind. Acts 1907, c. 76, §§1, 2, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§56-201,
56-202.
8. Citizens of this state had long believed that the present abstract-
ing system was too complicated and expensive. Individual bar
associations tried to help the situation by setting up their own
methods of abstracting in order to stop the present practice of
hunting for technicalities on which to base suits. Lists of items
were made the omission of which would not affect the marketabil-
ity of titles and were to be waived in the examination of abstracts.
Zechiels, "The Problem of Abstracts of Title" (1945) 20 Ind.
L.J. 303 discusses the situation and bar association recommenda-
tions to remedy it.
9. The proposed statute of limitations was discussed section by sec-
tion in the Bar Committee Report, "The Proposed Statute of
Limitations" (1947) 22 Ind. L.J. 165, 179, and compared with the
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan acts which were used as
drafting models. Those statutes were adopted in 1941, 1943, and
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transactions by permitting persons dealing with a record
title owner to rely on a record title covering a period of more
than fifty years prior to the date of the transaction.
Chapter 193 abolishes rights of action affecting the pos-
session or title of real property founded upon (1) an unre-
corded instrument executed more than fifty years prior to
the commencement of the action, or (2) a recorded instru-
ment, recorded more than fifty years prior to the filing of
the action, held by a person not in possession at the time of
the suit, or (3) a transaction, act, event, or omission occur-
ing more than fifty years prior to the commencement of the
action, or (4) a claim based on an interest arising out of
the failure of a husband or wife to join in a conveyance by
the other spouse where the instrument of conveyance does
not affirmatively disclose intermarriage and has been re-
corded for a period of fifty years. 10 If a verified notice of a
claim of interest in the real property is recorded within the
fifty-year period and an action is commenced on this claim
within one year the interest is not extinguished.11
A marketable title is established in a record title owner
who has had an unbroken chain of title for fifty years and
against whose title no notice of claim has been filed. A
purchaser for value is likewise vested with title, free of any
claim not filed. However, the record title owner is given a
marketable title only in that interest in the land which the
muniments of his title purport to convey to him. The stat-
ute does not apply against one in adverse possession of the
real property.
Disability or lack of knowledge of any kind does not
suspend the running of the fifty-year period.i 3 However,
claims may be filed by a representative of a claimant under
a disability who may be unable to assert a claim in his own
behalf, or one of a class whose identity cannot be established
or is uncertain at the time.14
1945 respectively. No cases had been brought to trial under any
of them at the time of the drafting of the Indiana act.
10. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 193, §1.
11. Requirements as to the manner of filing and contents of the
notice of claim are specified in the act, §3.
12. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 193, §5.
13. Id. §7.
14. There is some doubt as to whether this places an affirmative
duty upon such a representative (as a guardian) to file a claim,
or is merely a privilege of which the representative may take
advantage for the benefit of the person under the disability.
[Vol. 22
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The act does not bar any lessor or his successor as re-
versioner of his right to possession on the expiration of any
lease, nor any mortgagee or his successor under a mortgage
extending more than fifty years.15 Included in the class of
interests extinguished are statutory rights in lieu of dower,
or curtesy, reversions, tax deeds, and rights as heir or under
a will.16 It is immaterial whether these claims are asserted
by a person for himself or for another, by a resident or non-
resident, by a natural or corporate person, or by a private
or governmental body. This is one of the comparatively few
instances in which a statute of limitations is allowed to run
against the state.17
The act specifically repeals Acts of 1941, chapter 141,
section 1 and 2.18 This act was ignored to a large extent
by members of the bar who were not convinced of its consti-
tutionality, and consequently no cases were ever brought to
trial under it. In discussions, the validity of the statute was
questioned and it was predicted to be constitutional in spite
of its retrospective aspects.", The 1941 act did not affect
interests of persons under disabilities, pending litigation,
or vested property rights. It in no way changed laws per-
taining to adverse possession. No long established property
interests were intended to be affected. The main purpose
of the act was to correct mechanical errors and to bar claims
not excepted from the act. The new act in its provisions re-
garding vested interests and disabilities is believed to accom-
plish those things which the legislature expressly did not
intend doing in the older act.
Ordinarily, one cannot be divested of a vested property
right without his consent.2 0  It is an absolute and uncondi-
tional right.21 But it is recognized that statutes of limitations
15. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 193, §8.
16. Id. §9.
17. Littell, "A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitation" (1945). 21
Ind. L.J. 23, 39, shows that only six states have limitations on the
time in which a state may bring an action on real property.
18. Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1933) §2-626. That act provided that
defects, imperfections, or adverse claims which appeared in ab-
stracts of title or were matters of record 35 years or more prior to
the time that property might be sold were to cease to exist and
were barred against the present owner of the property.
19. Note (1941) 17 Ind. L.J. 176 discusses the constitutionality and
effect, of the act.
20. Merchants Bank v. Garrard, 158 Ga. 867, 124 S.E. 715 (1924).
21. State v. Hackman, 272 Mo. 609, 199 S.W. 990 (1917).
19471 401"
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may constitutionally bar remedial actions as to rights al-
ready in existence if a reasonable opportunity is given in
which to assert them. No interest or claim is to be barred
by the new act until the lapse of one year after its passage.
The act provides that any person whose rights would be
barred now by the act must assert such rights by January
21, 1948, or be forever barred. Since the act does not take
effect until proclamation by the governor, there will be a
very short time in which these claims must be filed in order
to preserve them. 2
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Motor Carriers-The legislature made few important changes
or additions to public utility law. Chapter 299 permits a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity held by a com-
mon carrier operating motor vehicles on the public high-
ways to be sold, assigned, leased, bequeathed or transferred,
upon approval by the Public Service Commission, in part
as well as in the entirety. The prior act made no provision
for partial disposal.
Rate Bases-Chapter 307 provides that the Public Service
Commission in determining a rate base shall evaluate public
utility property according to its "fair value" instead of its
"current, fair cash value."' 2 This change in word formula
should make no difference in the Commission's technique.
The Commission is to give such consideration as it considers
appropriate to all bases of valuation which may be presented
or which the Commission has already been authorized to con-
sider. It is settled that a rate making commission is not
bound to any one or combination of rate formula.3
22. Thus one of the big questions in regard to the new act is whether
enough time is given in which to file notice to preserve claims.
The Michigan act of 1945, No. 200, from which this act was mod-
eled in part, allowed one year in which to file notice to save claims,
and the validity of the provision was questioned in 44 Mich. L.R.
45, and prophesy made that it would be held constitutional. No
cases are on record testing the constitutionality of that act. It
was also suggested with regard to the Michigan act that abstractors
might continue to trace titles back farther than the forty years
provided by the statute, but the new act would simplify the job
of advising clients as prospective purchasers.
1. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 47-1219.
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 54-203.
3. F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 319 U.S. 735 (1942).
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